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Abstract: Corruption has been a subject to social construction and 
reconstruction for a long time. The social dimension of corruption means that 
this is a phenomenon whose meaning, positive or negative values are deter-
mined by people. Corruption changes, since it was already a subject to 
changes in the past. Therefore, if we currently believe that negative effects of 
corruption is something right and promotes the stability of society, then it is 
not enough to refer to research, analyses or descriptions of the phenomenon. 
Even if in certain situations society is forced to offer bribes, lead anti-corrup-
tion policy or take specific actions, we have to make moral choices all the 
time and prove to ourselves that this activity is undesirable, especially in the 
developed countries.  
The aim of this article is to analyze and assess the issue of corruption, 
including topics such as: emergence of corruption, effects of corruption, 
reducing the level of corruption, Poland against the background of corruption 
and the correlative analysis of corruption in the world. 
Key words: corruption, business, private sector. 
JEL: M2, O3, O5. 
 
*   *   * 
 
ne of the most important aspects of social life is the population’s 
professional and personal life. However, it is work that gives results 
in the form of remuneration and influences the population’s possi-
bilities, the occupied position in society, desires for professional development 
and influences the quality of personal life. For the economy of a given 
country to develop, accurate conditions for business must be created; after all, 
it is the enterprises that pay taxes, which feed the state budget. The economy 
is the society’s bloodstream, it makes funds from the broadly understood 
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private sphere flow to the public sphere and vice versa. Corruption may cause 
disruptions in the process of commodity and service flow inside the economic 
system and at the economy’s point of contact, with the private sector. Howe-
ver, does corruption always play a negative role?  What do professionals think 
about the phenomenon of corruption in the current reality?  
The aim of the article is to analyze and assess the issue of corruption, 
including topics such as the emergence of corruption, effects of corruption, 
reducing the level of corruption, Poland against corruption and correlational 
analysis of corruption in the world.  
The political and economic environment plays a significant role in 
terms of the influence of these surroundings on the firm’s activity and the 
development of entrepreneurship. As the state changes, its approach to econo-
mic processes, the quality of its institutions largely determines the type of 
incentives that affect companies; it is expressed, for example, in what is 
allowed and what is not, otherwise which actions cause one to receive severe 
punishment and which do not. As rightly noted by C. Douglas North (1990, p. 
79): “When public contracts are awarded to companies with the highest 
productivity and innovation, enterprises will try to develop these qualities, but 
when corruptive behaviours are rewarded, companies with this attitude will be 
the winning ones on the market.”  
Corruption is the abuse of a social position to obtain economic benefits 
for oneself. Despite the occurrence of criminal penalties for corruptive beha-
vior for the public and private sector, in which a pejorative1 understanding of 
entrepreneurship absorbs corruptive practices, the level of this phenomenon is 
still dependent on the standards of life of a given country’s citizens.  
The study is of theoretical and empirical nature; analyses from the  
scientific research papers of domestic and foreign authors and the correlation 
analysis have been used.  
 
 
Emergence of the phenomenon of corruption 
 
Corruption is not a creation of the modern times, and its presence was 
already noted in the period when the first structures of power were shaped. 
(Bielecki, 2002, p. 45). The world of business accepts the concept that 
corrupttion on a smaller scale has long been an accepted way to do business, 
                                                          
1  Pejorative (Latin pejor = worse) means a negative feature of a word in a sense that 
diminishes, degrades, discourages. There is a phrase “pejorative connotations” or “pejorati-
ve overtone”, which means that the given meaning, word sound is not well received, although 
it does not have to be vulgar. 
Economic Archive 4/2018 
 
17 
and in many countries, it is an integral tool to conclude a transaction. 
(BukowskI, 1978, p. 5) 
Since the 1950s, views of economists on corruption have been gradu-
ally changing.  To begin with, some research and analysis have proved that 
corruption, though morally reprehensible, in practice often facilitates ex-
change of goods and facilitates the flow of money, and thus contributes to 
growth of the economy (Lui, 1996). Other researches and analyses have 
demonstrated something quite the opposite - that corruption is actually dys-
functional for the economy, as it lowers the level of trust between players on 
the market, which increases uncertainty of transactions and ultimately dama-
ges the entire economy. (Treisman, 2000). It also affects household finances 
(Pukała & Adamisin, 2015). 
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the distinction bet-
ween the public and private spheres was not very clear in the nineteenth-
century Europe, which was touched upon, for example, by Max Weber in his 
writings or more historically by historian and political scientist James Scott. 
(Scott, 1969) 
What is particularly interesting in the discussion of Andrzej Mączak 
(Mączak, 1986) is the described way in which corruption was battled during 
the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This concerns the plot of royal 
treasurers, appointed for life by the king of officials who, in exchange for a 
permanent, relatively high salary, were obliged to watch over the collection of 
taxes. In spite of their high social status and high income, they probably 
belonged to the most corrupt element of the royal administration - in addition 
to their salary, they collected two types of bribes: “sack” (the name comes 
from sacks which were used to transport money) and “glove” which comes 
from suppliers of various goods and services for the crown. Interestingly, as 
Mączak indicates, nobody at that time was agitated with this practice, but 
merely the amount of these “commissions”. At the same time, Mączak reports 
very accurate results of research of another historian, Jacob van Kleveren, 
who made a thesis that at least till the eighteenth century, trade of offices in 
European countries was a standard. Where it was not organized by the state, it 
took the form of corruption, but it was still part of the system of exercising 
power in these societies.  
Even in 1996, Gordon Tullock (Tullock, 1996), a well-known econo-
mist and candidate for the Nobel Prize of 2003, condemning corruption in 
general, recognized that it could play a positive role as a kind of supplement 
to the low salaries of officials, motivating them for more flexible and entre-
preneur-friendly actions.  
At the end of the 1990s, in many developed countries (including Fran-
ce, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium), entrepreneurs bribing civil 
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servants to obtain large public contracts could simply deduct such “addi-
tional” costs of acquiring new orders from tax. The situation began to change 
only after the OECD Convention entered into force; it spoke of fighting 
against bribery of foreign public officials in international commercial trans-
actions in 1997.1 
Poland belongs to the group of countries in the European Union with 
the highest perception of corruption. Various factors have contributed to this 
state. These included large-scale transfer of political power and property, 
connected with the political transformation, i.e., with democratization of the 
state and transformations in the sphere of ownership. Systemic transformation 
has also brought profound changes in the social structure, which are not 
without influence on the political culture of society.2 
Corruption is conditioned by established social values, habits and atti-
tudes that are considered a norm in some countries of the world.  Society must 
clearly know what corruption, violation of certain values and principles, and 
acceptable social norms are.   
Business is an area prone to corruption, where there are countless 
opportunities to commit crimes and have dishonest, unethical behaviour. A lot 
of businesses are looking for innovative ways to improve efficiency and main-
tain competitive advantage in order to survive (Petrova et al., 2018a). This 
requires the development of various techniques for improving their business 
competitiveness (Petrova et al., 2018b); (Odinokova, 2018); (Sushchenko, 
2016). 
In addition to behaviour based on committing crimes, there occur 
events of “pericorruptive” behaviour, i.e., acting against ethics and good busi-
ness practice. 
A great example may be the Chinese institution guanxi, which, in a 
nutshell, is simply a network of personal, family connections and influences 
that largely determine the shape of business, political or social relations. 
Guanxi is rooted in the centuries-old Chinese tradition, which has survived 
years of modernizations and communist revolutions; today it still persists 
despite the pressures of the capitalistic model of the economy’s organization. 
(Ling, 2011) 
The number and quality of regulations is related to presence of the 
state in economic life. As the research shows, the bigger the presence, ex-
pressed in limitation of the free market, narrowing of free competition or a 
                                                          
1 The OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in inter-
national commercial transactions, drafted in Paris on December 17, 1997 (OJ of 2001, no. 23, 
item 264). 
2 Further on this topic, R. Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption In Post-
communist Societies, New York 2005: M.E.Sharpe, Inc. 
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large number of state firms receiving subventions from the state budget, the 
greater the corruption. (Djankov et al., 2002) 
The basic conditions conducive to emergence and spread of corruption 
include (Hankiss, 1986):  
1. creation of a common and social good to be shared in society,  
2. delegation of rights to persons who have become administrators of 
that good,  
3. creating a system of sharing the good considered by the community 
to be right, accepted and subject to severe sanctions, so that it is unprofitable 
in gaining individual benefits. 
Currently, views have focused on the negative aspect of this problem. 
The prevailing law and opinions of scientists rather point to the fact that 
corruption is a socially damaging phenomenon and is forbidden.  
The question arises: what negative effects does corruption bring to 
economic and social life? 
 
 
Effects of corruption  
 
The effect of corruption, which is most commonly pointed out in re-
searches, is the negative influence on investments: the higher the level of 
corruption, the lesser the investment share in GDP is. (Mauro, 1998). The 
need to offer bribes in order to obtain a license, for example. Corruption also 
has a negative impact on foreign investors. It reduces certainty of stable 
business operations, increases costs and investment risk. As a result, investors 
prefer to invest in less corrupt countries.  
For many countries, including Poland and Ukraine, foreign invest-
ments are an important component of economic development, and their reduc-
tion or lack thereof brings negative effects. Analysis of statistical indicators 
shows that despite the desire of Ukraine to carry out implementation of the 
innovative type of economic development, institutional environment does not 
provide sufficient incentives and economic instruments for implementation of 
innovative changes, which has also confirmed the rating position innova-
tiveness of the economy of Ukraine. (Labunska et al., 2017). To assess 
corruption, foreign investors are based on various indices; one of the most 
popular indices is the Corruption Perception Index - CPI.  
Corruption is correlated with GDP per capita. The lower value of do-
mestic and foreign investments translates into lower GDP per capita, the 
lower the economic growth is. Probably, a high level of corruption limits the 
country's prosperity and opportunities for further development. Examples of 
countries characterized by low levels of corruption and high GDP per capita 
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are: Denmark, - 58207.90, Finland- 45288.63, Sweden, - 54988.62, New 
Zealand - 36463.53, Norway - 89741.21 etc.  
On the other hand, poor countries such as: Somalia - 187.00, South 
Sudan - 717.70, Haiti - 731.23, Myanmar - 824.19 are very corrupt and show 
low levels of GDP per capita. It is also worth noting that rich countries are 
characterized by good quality of regulations and institutions, a free market 
and high competition. In contrast, poor countries have ineffective, “weak” 
institutions, low-quality regulations, limited competition and free market.  
Another negative effect of corruption is its impact on state expenditure 
and the provision of public goods, such as infrastructure or health care. For 
example, the presence of corruption in public tenders may lead to purchase of 
a commodity (service) at higher prices and lower quality than in the case 
where corruption would not exist. This entails growth and inefficiency of 
expenses. Choosing an offer with a lower price and better quality of the 
commodity (service) would allow decreasing expenses and allocating the 
saved funds for other needs. (Gupta et al., 2001) 
At this point, one should also pay attention to a view regarding the 
positive impact of corruption on the economy. The hypothesis came about in 
the 60s of the previous year and assumed that in the case of inefficient and 
bureaucratic economy, corruption may allow for more efficient and faster 
solving of certain problems (e.g., issuing a decision on business activity). 
(Huntington, 1999) 
Generally, economists take the view (although there is still no clear 
evidence to support this thesis) that corruption causes a slowdown in the rate 
of economic growth. (Kamiński & Kamiński, 2004). This in turn means that 
the economy is not able to generate income for the state or create workplaces, 
which, of course, fosters unemployment and all other negative phenomena 
associated with it. Economists also try to prove that corruption aggravates 
inequalities in the distribution of income (Gupta et al.,1998). Other negative 
consequences of corruption commonly mentioned in the source literature are: 
• outflow of qualified workforce,  
• improper allocation of funds to unprofitable investments. 
What is often mentioned, is the decline in the state's tax revenues, 
because it is obvious that corrupt companies tend to avoid paying taxes.1 
It should be noted that the phenomena of corruption and the gray zone 
are strongly interrelated: research indicates that a high level of gray economy 
is also accompanied by a high level of corruption. (Buehn & Schneider, 2007) 
                                                          
1 See D. Kaufmann, W., Shang-Jin, Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed Up the Wheels of 
Commerce, International Monetary Fund, 2000; D. Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A 
Cross-National Study, Journal of Public Economics 2000, vol. 76, pp. 399–457.  
Economic Archive 4/2018 
 
21 
Countries with low levels of corruption have high GDP per capita, as 
well as clear and effective regulations and a free market. In contrast, highly 
corrupt countries are characterized with inefficient administration, non-trans-
parent regulations, low GDP per capita, and often lack of a free market and 
competition. (Cichocki, 2012). 
 
 
Limiting the level of corruption  
 
Under such conditions, the authority of the official is large. This 
creates possibilities to extort bribes in exchange, for example, favourable 
interpretation of a specific regulation or its non-compliance. An example of 
this type of regulation is the Act on Personal Income Tax from 19911. 
The official's high authority weakens the position of the petitioner, 
who - wanting to obtain a decision that is favourable to them, tends towards 
paying a bribe, saving time and incurring lower costs than if they have 
decided to settle the matter in the standard way. Clear, precise, stable and 
transparent regulations strengthen the position of the client, while weakening 
the authority of the official - they are less corrupt. At the same time, it is 
pointed out that although too many regulations are problematic, if they meet 
the above-mentioned conditions, they do not induce corruption themselves. 
(Lambsdorff & Cornelius, 2000) 
Corruption, when made public, will strengthen in the society’s cons-
ciousness as a lawful act and become more difficult to battle. This creates a 
common element of relations between society and the state. Combating this 
phenomenon must begin with the state, but the problem is heightened if the 
state is dominated by powerful interest groups, for which the existence of 
strengthening public institutions is the greatest threat. Tolerating corruption in 
such conditions may quickly lead to “[...] a vicious circle, when a high level 
of the state’s intervention, inefficiency of the market and corruption mutually 
strengthen and consolidate.” )Alesina & Angeletos, 2005) 
Politicians talk a lot about the need to fight corruption, but when it 
comes to specific actions, they behave like citizens that believe it is necessary 
to limit the state’s expenditures, but immediately protest with anger when 
expenditures on programs, which they use themselves are cut off. Another 
effect of corruption, which makes it a phenomenon that is difficult to weed 
out, is its influence on the fall of public values in the society’s culture. Inter-
national researches, which have been carried out in the recent years confirm 
the existence of a strong link between corruption in the functioning of the 
                                                          
1 Act on personal income tax (OJ no. 80, item 350).  
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state and the level of citizens' trust in public institutions, which is obvious, but 
also - what is less obvious - with a lack of trust in human relations. (Newton 
& Norris, 1999) The quality of the law and efficiency in its enforcement exert 
a particularly strong influence on the level of trust in this sphere. (Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2002) 
 However, there are examples of effective reduction of the corruption 
level.1 A condition for this efficiency is the political will. An important step in 
forming an anti-corruption policy is its prevention. “Most of these options are 
limited along with limiting the state’s role in the economy. A limited govern-
ment requires fewer construction contracts, acquires fewer equipment and 
may reduce taxes.” )Rose-Ackerman, 2002) 
 The process of limiting corruption must be subject to robust oversight. 
Otherwise, this may lead to increased corruption and the opening of new 
sources of corruption. Let us also note that reduction of the state's role has its 
limits, beyond which chaos lurks. The essence of the political dilemma is that 
“a small government does not adequately correct inequalities and market 
injustices; a large government increases corruption and the search for pen-
sion.” )Alesina & Angeletos, 2005) 
To summarize, it should be emphasized that the problem of corruption 
may be solved with three components. These are primarily well-formulated, 
clear and understandable legal regulations. However, this may be insufficient; 
another important issue is the education of society and urgent compliance to 
legal rules.  
This is because a higher level of corruption is found in countries with a 
large number of unintelligible regulations, with officials holding significant, 
discretionary power, strong state presence in the economy and limited compe-
tition on the market.2  
 
 
Poland against the background of corruption   
 
Governmental Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2013-2018. The newest 
document, which propagates an anti-corruption strategy in Poland is the 
Governmental Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2013-2018. The document is 
prepared considering the experience gained as part of the Strategy’s imple-
                                                          
1 Examples of such effective efforts to reduce corruption are discussed by Robert 
Klitgaard (1988), Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
2  This entitles state authorities to make decisions in a free manner, i.e., not restricted 
by specific legal provisions. However, this does not equal the possibility of making decisions 
based on private whims. 
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mentation in the years 2002-2009. The aim of the Strategy is lowering the 
level of corruption in Poland through intensification of preventive and 
educational activities both in society as well as in public administration. 
Further activity in fighting corruption is also continued. The prepared do-
cument contains detailed goals, tasks and points towards activities for entities 
responsible for counteracting and fighting corruptive behaviours.1 
Governmental anti-corruption strategies are aimed at identifying, 
preventing and combating corruption primarily in the state sector, with parti-
cular emphasis on the disposal of public funds. Private enterprises that operate 
in the surroundings of other subjects make every effort to form an opinion 
about them, which is far from suspicions of practice of unfair competition and 
use of corruptive methods. That is why entrepreneurs who care about the good 
name of their firm introduce rules for applying good practices, which are 
included in the codes of ethics. Compliance with ethical recommendations 
contributes to the company's profits as it reduces the incidence of corruption, 
embezzlement and use of the so-called bad practices. What is more, it limits 
behaviours, which result in conflicts of interests. On the other hand, comp-
lying with the adopted rules turns into trust of the clients, contractors and 
partners and raises loyalty and credibility of staff. The need to introduce 
ethical principles in the prospect of enterprises was also recognized by the 
Polish Chamber of Commerce, which developed a model for the organi-
zation's functioning in dealing with employees and business partners. Accor-
ding to assumptions of the suggested concept (titled “Fair Play Enterprise”), a 
firm may achieve measurable effects in checking reliability of proceedings in 
the field of advertising and promotion, contacts with clients, contacts with 
contractors, solving problems related to employees and reliability towards the 
state treasury.2 
When considering the problem of corruption, it is worth paying 
attention to the interpenetration of various issues. Corruption is difficult to 
grasp, it is affected by the law and public awareness conditioned by the 
history of its creation and the old desire of people to make big money in a 
short time. Corruption is a deed forbidden by law and its exposure may have 
negative effects for both parties. The “concealed” nature of corruption leads 
to difficulties in carrying out research into this phenomenon.  
                                                          
1 Draft of the Governmental Anti-Corruption Strategy for the years 2013-2018. 
2 Poradnik antykorupcyjny dla przedsiębiorców, Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne, 
Warszawa 2011, pp. 48-50. 
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Correlation analysis of corruption  
 
The organization Transparency International has published the Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI), which presents results in this regard.  
In a 2015 rank, Poland took 30th place (out of 167) and scored as 
many as 62 points, in 2014 - 61 points (2013 - 60) and was classified at 35th 
place (in 2013 - 38), which means better assessment compared to the position 
from the previous year. 
Unfortunately, Ukraine cannot claim a high level of transparency, 
although there is visible improvement. In 2015, it scored as little as 27 points 
and the distant 130th place in the rank right at the bottom of all presented 
positions. This is not good information; it points to the fact that in spite of the 
improvement made year by year in terms of its high level of corruptness, the 
results show major problems related to corruption in this country.  
 It should be emphasized that Denmark made another stand at the head 
of the rank (first place) with a score of 91 points (in 2015), Finland was ran-
ked second with 91 points, and Sweden third - with 89 points. 
The Corruption Perception Index presents an evaluation of 175 
countries, of which over 2/3 scored less than 50 points.   
Since 2012, TI has used a different methodology compared to the one 
in previous years; it grants from 0 to 100 points, where 0 equals the largest 
corruption, and - 100 the highest transparency. This change should enable 
accurate observation of trends and comparison of results with reference to 
previous years. 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is prepared by Trans-
parency International every year since 1995, is a leading determinant of the 
perception of corruption in the public sector. 
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Table 1  
Selected countries with a low-level perception of corruption 
Specification 
GDP PER CAPITA 
PPP Rank of corruption 
United States 52549.01 16 
China 13400.27 83 
Japan 35804.23 18 
Germany 44053.07 10 
Great Britain 38657.79 10 
France 37305.69 23 
India 5730.14 76 
Italy 33587.12 61 
Brazil 14454.94 76 
Canada 42890.88 9 
North Korea 34386.57 37 
Australia 43654.58 13 
Russia 23895.34 119 
Spain 32814.45 36 
Mexico 16501.94 95 
Indonesia 10385.3 88 
Poland 24835.9 30 
Ukraine 7449.77 130 
Source: Author’s own study based on data from Transparency International, 2015  
 
Basing on randomly selected countries of the world, two variables 
distinguished by a low level of perception of corruption were correlated, such 
as: GDP PER CAPITA PPP and corruption rank indices.   
 n=18 on a scale from 0 to 100 
Calculation of Pearson's linear correlation coefficient.  
 
 
r = - 0.84 
 
 The result indicates a very strong dependence of the correlation 
between two variables; the dependence is negative.  
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Table 2 
Selected countries with high-level of perception of corruption 
No. Countries  GDP per capita PPP Rank of corruption 
1 Maldives 11892.5 134 
2 Comoros 1363.56 136 
3 Nigeria 5638.89 136 
4 Tajikistan 2616.19 136 
5 Bangladesh 3136.6 139 
6 Guinea 2854.75 139 
7 Kenya 2901.01 139 
8 Laos 5341.31 139 
9 Papua New Guinea 2854.75 139 
10 Uganda 1717.83 139 
11 Central African Republic 562.19 145 
12 Republic of the Congo 5993.15 146 
13 Chad 2043.54 147 
14 Congo 736.68 147 
1 Myanmar 1324.61 147 
16 Burundi 692.67 150 
17 Cambodia 3278.2 150 
18 Zimbabwe 1687.98 150 
19 Uzbekistan 5642.82 153 
20 Eritrea 1411.16 154 
21 Syria 4684.72 154 
22 Turkmenistan 15527.4 154 
23 Yemen 3663.31 154 
24 Guinea-Bissau 1367.3 158 
25 Haiti 1658.41 158 
26 Venezuela 15602.9 158 
27 Iraq 14017.8 161 
28 Libya 13320.8 161 
29 Angola 6937.01 163 
30 Equatorial Guinea 28271.8 163 
31 South Sudan 1741.1 163 
32 Sudan 3927.49 165 
33 Afghanistan 1820.3 166 
34 Somalia 547.32 167 
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r = 0.26 
r^2= 0.07 
There is a very weak positive correlation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a very strong negative dependence between GDP per capita 
PPP and the results of the corruption rank; in other words, if PPP per capita 
GDP is high, the level of perceived corruption in the country drops. The 
phenomenon of corruption is decreasing. It is not well perceived and it is not 
profitable to give bribes when the country is at a relatively high level of 
economic development. However, in countries where the level of perception 
of corruption is high and GDP per capita indicates a low level, there is a very 
weak correlation, but it is positive. This result shows that in a country with a 
low standard of living, the phenomenon of corruption can have a positive 
impact on the country's economic development. As already mentioned, it can 
stimulate the population to some extent.   
The attitude and consent of the government and society to corruption 
play a significant role, as counteracting and combating corruption becomes 
very difficult under these conditions. Unmasking irregularities at the work-
place or whistleblowing are still too rare, as both parties are responsible for 
committing the prohibited act. Both parties, both the individual giving the 
financial advantage as well as the individual receiving it, will not disclose this 
fact, as each of them is exposed to criminal sanctions. This phenomenon still 
raises great controversy; this also regards incomprehensible wording of legal 
acts, which causes different interpretations and views. Many people speak out 
in favour of one side or the other, they claim that it would be accurate to settle 
a certain case by giving a bribe, while others proclaim that this is immoral 
behaviour, but should someone want to offer them a bribe, they would gladly 
accept it. It should be emphasized that a part of society considers corruption 
to be a negative phenomenon, but if the situation concerns their private life, 
then they cannot guarantee that they would not take advantage if an oppor-
tunity presented itself.1 The surveyed respondents evaluate these practices as 
reprehensible, not as a crime.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Conclusion from the author's own research, questionnaire survey conducted on a 
group of 263 respondents in 2015-2018, in Poland and Ukraine.  
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